Trends in extradition from Poland to Russia | In Principle

The outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine greatly changed the practice for cooperation by Polish prosecutors’ offices and courts with the justice system of the Russian Federation. Before 2022, Russia submitted more extradition requests than any other country to Poland, and the Polish courts sometimes routinely accepted the requests. Four years on, it is a good moment to examine these relations and consider how they might look in the near future.

A freeze

The Russian aggression against Ukraine effectively froze extraditions between Russia and Poland, particularly on the Polish side. Extradition activity on the Russian side dropped after the invasion of Ukraine only at first. Currently the Russian authorities submit dozens of extradition requests to Poland every year.

This is because the Agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal matters from 1996 has not been repudiated. Thus, under that treaty, and because Poland is bound by the European Convention on Extradition, the Polish authorities continue to take up extradition proceedings initiated by the Russian Federation, e.g. via Interpol Red Notices.

So where is the cooperation frozen? It can be seen in Polish prosecutors’ sceptical approach to Russian requests, and in their demand that the Polish courts find the legal inadmissibility of extradition to Russia. Also, prosecutors have more rarely sought temporary arrest and have rarely applied other preventive measures. And the Polish courts have found that extradition is legally inadmissible, even in cases where the Russian documents show that a serious offence has been committed. The courts have identified concerns over infringement of human rights, the lack of fair-trial guarantees, and appalling conditions at Russian prisons. Finally, the Minister of Justice has refused to turn over suspects to Russia, or has revoked earlier decisions allowing extradition.

A breakthrough in the courts?

The lack of cooperation by the Polish authorities in light of the current situation in Ukraine seems obvious.

However, the question arose in 2025 whether there could be a change in attitude. This was sparked by a case before the Radom Regional Court involving a Russian citizen suspected of committing common (non-political) offences. In the decision of 17 July 2025 (case no. II Kop 35/25), that court found that extradition was legally admissible, in light of two circumstances. First, the Russian side had submitted diplomatic assurances guaranteeing the accused the right to a defence, and asserting that the accused’s rights and freedoms under the UN International Covenant on Human and Political Rights would be respected, and thus the Polish court found that the grounds making extradition inadmissible did not exist. Second, the accused in that case had consented to extradition.

That decision could be regarded as a breakthrough. But the problem is that the consent of the accused should not exclude a thorough analysis of the existence of bars to extradition, particularly those set forth in Criminal Procedure Code Art. 604 §1(5) (extradition would conflict with Polish law) and Art. 604 §1(7) (concern that the person’s rights and freedoms could be infringed in the requesting state). After all, these bars are absolute, and if they are found to exist, then the extradition is inadmissible, regardless of the consent of the accused (J. Zagrodnik (ed.), Criminal Procedure Code: Commentary (WKP 2024)).

In other words, the Radom Regional Court had a duty to evaluate the state of human rights protection in the requesting state based not only on diplomatic assurances, but also other sources (e.g. reports by NGOs, international organisations, and government agencies). This duty applies not only to cases initiated by the Russian Federation, but to any case in which another country seeks extradition from Poland. In the case from Radom, no such analysis was conducted.

Will this shift last?

But it seems that the ruling from Radom in that case was an aberration. According to available data, in 2025 the Polish regional courts and courts of appeal found in other cases that extradition was inadmissible. This confirms the existing trend, as illustrated by two cases discussed below.

The first case did not involve extradition per se, but a request to transfer a Russian citizen to Russia to serve out a prison sentence there which was imposed by a Polish court. The Gdańsk Court of Appeal held that it cannot be concluded from the mere fact that the Polish/Russian treaty remains in force that “turning over a Russian citizen is admissible, despite the well-grounded concern that in the Russian Federation the prisoner may be subjected to torture or other infringement of his rights and freedoms” (decision of 1 July 2025, case no. II AKz 509/25). Turning over the prisoner was held to be inconsistent with Polish law.

The second case highlighted the problem of the reliability of diplomatic assurances, and suggested great caution in assessing such assurances. In a case involving extradition of a Georgian citizen to Russia, the Opole Regional Court stated: “With respect to the assurances from Russia concerning the possibility of supervision by staff of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland of observance of these guarantees provided by the Russian Federation, through site visits at the penal institution where the accused will be housed, we must cite the official communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that Poland has been recognised by the authorities of the Russian Federation as a hostile country, and the number of staff at diplomatic and consular posts of the Republic of Poland in Russia has been significantly reduced” (decision of 24 July 2025, case no. III Kop 37/25).

We might add that when assessing diplomatic assurances from the Russian Federation, the Polish courts must also consider that due to Russia’s exclusion from the Council of Europe, these assurances do not apply to guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights. In this situation, the evaluation criteria must be heightened.

Dr Artur Pietryka, adwokat, Business Crime practice, Wardyński & Partners